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COMMENTS

JUDICIAL LEGISLATION-PATENT LAW-HAS THE DOCTRINE
oF CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT BEEN REPUDIATEo?-When
leaders quarrel the rank and file may flounder; and, in their recent decision of Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co.,1 the justices
of the Supreme Court have created confusion for lawyers. Four of the
seven opinions clearly express intent to promulgate a new rule of law;
two deny that intent; one is indefinite; and the purpose of the Court as
a whole is left in doubt. Though the decision affects only the patent
law, the process of decision concerns every lawyer.
It has long been the accepted rule that, when actionable infringement of a patent occurs, anyone who consciously and purposely aids in

1

(U.S. 1944) 64 S. Ct. 268, 88 L. Ed. 262.
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, the infringement is himself liable for what is commonly called "contributory" infringement.2 The rule is nothing anomalous, of course; it
is the conventional doctrine respecting torts. As one court put it, "In
dealing with this subject of contributory infringement, it might be observed that we are dealing with a phase of the general subject of torts.
An infringer is a tort-feasor. A contributory infringer is one whose
action contributes to the infringement." 3 In the Mercoid case the
Supreme Court seems to have thrown this well-established rule into
the discard, without explanation or examination of its merits.
The proceeding began with suit by Mid-Continent Investment. Co.
against Smith, alleging infringement by defendant of a patent owned by
plaintiff. The invention was the combination in a heating system, of
a combustion chamber, means for feeding fuel thereto, a thermostatic
switch designed to start or stop operation of the fuel f~eding mechanism
as room temperature changes, and another thermostatic switch designed
to start operation of the fuel-feeding mechanism, regardless of room
temperature, should furnace temperature fall so low as to indicate need
for refueling. No one of these four elements, combustion chamber,
feeding mechanism, or either switch, was patented; the invention was
the combination of the other three with the furnace-temperature operated switch. On an issue of the validity of the patent, wherein it was
admitted that the several parts of the combination were individually
old and unpatentable, the patent for the combination itself was declared
valid by both the trial and appellate courts, and the defendant was held
guilty of infringement. 4
A year or so later, Mid-Continent sued the Mercoid Corporation
for contributing. to infringement of that same patent. Mid-Continent,
although owner of the patent, did not itself manufacture the patented
combination, but had made the Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator
Company its exclusive licensee, and that company was brought into the
case as a party plaintiff. T.p.e defendant, Mercdid Corporation, had admittedly sold thermostatic switches to manufacturers of the patented
2 Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Machine Co., (No. 2), 213 U.S. 325, 29
S. Ct. 503 (1909); Fehr v. Activated Sludge, Inc., (C.C.A. 7th, 1936) 84 F. (2d)
948, "Municipal sewage plant extention contractors, supplying materials and work with
knowledge of and intent to aid in city sewage commission's infringement of sewage
purification patents, held liable as contributory infringers" (Syll.); Lincoln Engineering
Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., (C.C.A. 7th, 1937) 91 F. (2d) 757, "The supplier of
an element in a valid combination embodied in a patent might be guilty of infringement, though element was not patentable, and was old. . •. An infringer and a contributory infringer are tort-feasors" (Syll.).
8 Lincoln Engineering Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., (C.C.A. 7th, 1937) 91 F.
(2d) 757 at 763.
4 Smith v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., (C.C.A. 8th, 1939) 106 F. (2d) 622.
Smith's defense in these proceedings had been provided by the Mercoid Corp., although the latter did not appear as a party in the case.
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combination with lqiowledge that they were to be used in the combination without permission of the patentee. Thus, if the manufacturers
were in truth infringers, Mercoid was a contributory infringer, and was
sued as such.
Just what constitutes "infringement," as distinct from impliedly authorized and therefore legitimate "repair" of a patented device or combination, has always been an exceedingly difficult problem for the
courts. The precise line of distinction has not been drawn and, as a rule
of law, probably never can be drawn. The general, broad differentiation
is that "durable parts and elements of a patented combination may be
mended or repaired, but not replaced, and quickly perishable or consumed elements may be replaced." "To go beyond such mending is
reconstruction and infringement." 5 It would have been logically possible, though hardly sound factually, for the Court, in the Mercoid
case, to have dismissed the plaintiff's action on the ground that the
switches supplied by defendant were legitimate "repair" parts only,
hence no "infringement" had occurred. Then, since there was no infringement, there could have been no contributory infringement. There
is not the slightest suggestion of such reasoning in the Court's opinions,
however.
Another possible and clearly applicable reason for a decision adverse to the plaintiff is the well-established rule that a patentee who
attempts by the terms of his licenses to monopolize materials not
covered by his patent loses his right in equity to any remedy against
infringers. This rule had its inception when Henry v. A. B. Dick Co.6
was overruled in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg.
Co.7 Rightly or wrongly, beginning with the Motion Picture decision,
judicial noti:ons of wise economic policy have been asserted as premises,
without pretense of supporting data or real evaluation, affirmed, reasserted, and extended to the point that a patentee who attempts to
restrict permissible use of his invention to some related use of un5 Bassick Mfg. Co. v. _Ready Auto. Supply Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1927) 22 F. (2d)
331 at 340.
The probable line between repair and replacement is helpfully discussed by Jo
Baily Brown, "The Manufacture and Sale of Unpatented Parts," 18 JouR. OF PAT.
OFF. Soc. 573 (1936). See also, Brainard and Rule, "The Doctrine of Contributory Infringement as Modified by Recent Supreme Court Decisions," 6 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 357 at 358 (1938), "the distinction between reconstruction and repair depends
upon the facts of each case"; Mitchell, "When Does Repair of a Patented Article
Become an Infringement?" 22 CoRN. L. Q. 410 (1937).
6 224 U.S. 1, 32 S. Ct. 364 (1912).
7 243 U.S. 502, 37 S. Ct. 416 (1916).
The previous doctrine of the Dick Co. decision had been upset by "distinction" in
Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 33 S. Ct. 616 (1912). That the distinction was
virtually an overruling is obvious from the fact that the four majority judges in the
Dick case--only seven took part-were all opposed to the decision in Bauer v. O'Donnell, and the majority in that later case included the three dissenters of the earlier one.
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patented materials finds· himself un:able to enforce contracts embodying the limitation. He is not only without remedy against licensees who
thumb noses at th~ license limitations, but is even precluded from action
against outright infringers who make no pretense of ever having been
licensees. The ultimate effect of these progressive decisions has been
practically to deprive a patentee who attempts to limit his licensee:s' use
of unpatented materials of all value of his patent.8 Obviously, where
there is no enforceable right against a primary infringer there can be
none against contributory infringers. They are the necessarily nonexistent relations of the little man who is not there.9
In the Mercoid case, the trial court found as a fact that Mid-Continent and Minneapolis-Honeywell'had tried to monopolize unpatented
switches by restricting their licensees to use, in the patented combination, of switches bought from Minneapolis-Honeywell. On this finding
of fact the court followed established law in refusing remedy to the
plaintiffs.10 The circuit court of appeals, however, expressly repudiated
this finding of fact, saying,
" ... the District Court erred in holding that Mid-Continent's
method of doing business with respect to the patent is the practical
equivalent of granting a written license with the condition that the
patented system may be ,practiced only with combustion stoker
switches purchased from Mid-Continent's licensee, and in further
holding that such conduct amounted to an unlawful combination in
restraint of trade ... and an attempt on their part to suppress competition....
"We think the District Court's holdings in this respect are erroneous." 11
The district court's prei:nise for denying plaintiff's remedy against
the contributory infringer having been thus cut from under its reasoning, its decree was reversed; there was, in fact, no reason why plaintiffs
8 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 37 S. Ct.
416 (1916); Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8, 38 S. Ct. 257
(1917); American Lecithin Co. v. Warfield Co., (C.C.A. 7th, 1939) 105 F. (2d)
207, cert. denied 308 U.S. 609, 60 S. Ct. 175 (194o);"Morton Salt Co. v. Suppigar
Co., 314 U.S. 488, 62 S. Ct. 402 (1942); B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495,
62 S. Ct. 406 (1942).
.
The extent to which the Cour·t has gone in denying remedy to .monopoly-attempting patentees is discussed, Waite, ''The Validity of Conditions in ·Patent Licenses," 41
MICH. L. REV. 419 (1942).
9 Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S.
27, 51 S. Ct. 334 (1931); Ferguson Mfg. Works, Inc. v. American Lecithin Co.,
(C.C.A. 1st, 1938) 94 F. (2d) 729; Leitch Mfg. eo. v. Barber, 302 U.S. 458, 58
S. Ct. 288 (1937).
10 Mid-Continent Inv. Co. v. Mercoid Corp., (D.C. Ill. 1942) 43 F. Supp. 692.
11 Mid-Continent Inv. Co. v. Mercoid Corp., (C.C.A. 7th, 1943) 133 F. (2d)
803 at 810.
'
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should not recover if the appellate court's finding of fact were accepted.
But the Supreme Court, in its turn, declared that "There was ample
ev~dence to sustain the findings of the District Court that respondents
endeavored to use the license agreement so as to prevent the sale or use
of combustion stoker switches in these heating systems unless they were
the switches made by Minneapolis-Honeywell and purchased from it
or its sub-licensees." Accordingly that Court affirmed the district court's
action in refusing relief to the plaintiffs.
Thus far, therefore, the decision was wholly conventional; in full
accord with the well-established precedents. Defendant might unquestionably have contributed to an undeniable actual infringement, yet
have been held not liable because of plaintiff's unlawful attempt to
monopolize unpatented materials. And there the whole matter could
be rested, were it not for contrary assertions by the several justices. If
these be taken at face value, the decision was intended to go further and
to repeal, as it were, the whole doctrine of contributory infringement.
Justice Frankfurter expressly concurs in the proposition that a
patentee who attempts to monopolize unpatented materials will be
given no relief against infringers of his patent, nor against persons who
supply the infringers with materials for such a purpose. But having
said that, he goes further and, without making clear his reason for so
asserting, he charges the majority with having gone out of its way to
abolish the contributory infringement rule. He writes:
"To be sure, the doctrine of contributory infringement may be
misconceived and has been misapplied. That is the fate of all
shorthand statements of complicated ideas, whether in law or in
the natural sciences. But the misapplication of a formula into
which a complicated idea is compressed and thereby mutilated is a
poor excuse for rejecting the idea. It will be time enough to define
the appropriate limits of the doctrine of contributory infringement
when we are required to deal with the problem. Until then litigants and lower courts ought not to be embarrassed by gratuitous
innuendoes against a principle of the law which, within its proper
bounds, is accredited by legal history as well as ethics. The long
and on the whole not unworthy history of our judicial administration admonishes us against expressing views on matters not before
us. The history of this Court especially admonishes us against the
evils of giving opinions not called for •... The duty of not going
beyond the necessities of a case is not a lifeless technicality. The
experience of centuries is behind the wisdom of not deciding,
whether explicitly or by atmospheric pressure, matters that do not
come to the Court with the impact of necessity." 12
12

Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 64 S. Ct. 268 at 277.
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One might fairly assume this to have been no more than an unjustified slap at a majority opinion which he had misconceived. Certainly the opinion of Justice Douglas does no more than rest on the
conventional rule; nothing therein could be used as authority for any
proposition that a patentee who does not attempt-to monopolize unpatented material will be refused remedy against either infringer or
contributory infringer. The doctrine of contributory infringement was
not necessarily involved in the particular ca.se and was not repudiated,
either expressly or in fact, by the Douglas opinion. But Justice Black's
reply to the Frankfurter charge precludes the possibility of dismissing
the charge as mere surplusage.
Justice Black makes it clear that whatever Douglas had in mind, he
himself did intend to throw into the discard the whole preexisting and
well-established rule of contributory infringement. Slapping back at
Justice Frankfurter, he says,
"· .. It seems to me that the judicial error of discussing abstract questions is slight compared to the error of interpreting
legislative enactments on the basis of a court's preconceived views
on 'morals' and 'ethics.'
"If there is such a wrong as contributory infringement, it must
have been created by the federal patent statutes. Since they make
no direct ,mention of such a wrong, its existence could only be
rested on inferences as to Congressional intent. In searching for
Congressional intent we ordinarily look to such sources as statutory
language and legislative history: The dissent in question mentions
neither of these guides; in fact, it mentions no statute at all. Instead, the chief reliance appears to be upon the law of torts, a
quotation from a decision of a lower federal court which held that
no infringement was shown, and the writer's personal views on
'morals' and 'ethics.' Not one of these references, unless it be the
latter, throws enough light on the patent statutes to justify its use
in construing these statutes as creating, in addition to a right of recovery for infringement, a more expansive right ju~cially c~aracterized as a 'formula' of 'contributory infringement.' And for
judges to rest their interpretation of statutes on nothing but their
own conceptions of 'morals' and 'ethics' is, to say the least, dangerous business.
". . . With this in mind, I wish to make explicit my protest
against talking about the judicial doctrine of 'contributory infringement' as though it were entitled to the same respect as a
universally recognized moral truth." 13
Apparently, then, in Justice Black's philosophy, the tort of in1s1d. at 274-275.
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fringement, unlike other torts, does not involve in liability those who
consciously and purposely contribute to its commission. Justice Murphy
specifically concurred in the Black opinion, and presumably, therefore,
in its proposition of law.
.
Justice Jackson in his turn asserts that any patent for a combination
creates "an abstract right in an abstruse relationship between things in
which individually there is no right-----a legal concept which either is
very profound or almost unintelligible, I can not be quite sure
which.m 4 So he concludes, "I think we should protect the patent owner
in the enjoyment of just what he has been granted-----an abstract right in
an abstruse combination-whatever such a totality may be worth." 15
This conclusion, whether itself very profound or almost unintelligible,
is at least what Max Beerbohm might have called "inenubilous." But
apparently Justice Jackson, wondering if the Court ought not to repudiate also the established law of patentability of a combination, does repudiate the doctrine that infringement of a valid combination patent
can be participated in by persons who assist the infringer and thereby
contribute to the infringement.
Perhaps the situation is saved by the opinion of Justice Roberts,
Justice Reed joining, that the decision as a whole indicates no more than
the old rule, that "if the purchaser and user could not be amerced as
an infringer certainly one who sold to him ... cannot be amerced for
contributing to a non-existent infringement." 16
Nevertheless, that was not the opinion of Justice Black, nor of Justice Murphy concurring, nor, apparently of Justice Jackson. Neither
was it Justice Frankfurter's notion of what the majority opinion stands
for. Thus we have four of the six justices who expressed themselves on
the matter declaring that the decision upsets the long established doctrine that one who contributes to infringement of a valid patent is
himself liable to the patentee. If the Court, as a court, really intended
so drastic and definite a change in the law, it is most unfortunate that
the legislation should have been promulgated through personal, individual opinions, without any presentation of justifying data, evaluation of merits, or explanation of motive. But if, on the other hand,
the Court had no intent to do what its individual members say it
intended, one must regret that its personal dissensions sliould give
rise to such uncertainty.
"I think," opined Justice Roberts, "the opinion may create confusion respecting contributory infringement." 17
John B. Waite*
16 Id. at 275.
Id. at 277.
17 Id. at 27 5.
Id. at 278.
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.-Ed.
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